ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
A great deal of research is currently being conducted in the fields of information fusion and data fusion. The impetus for this research is the growing need for a system or systems capable of integrating many pieces and forms of information and providing a coherent interpretable output. Real world situations are often characterized by a large number of complex and uncertain events. These events generate uncertain information at different levels of abstraction linked together only by cause and effect. The challenge is how to effectively and efficiently represent, fuse and interpret such information to provide a useful output. To address this challenge, we consider the use of the cognitive process of sensemaking to support information fusion in such dynamic and uncertain situations. We know, apriori, that information from the senses is always fused and analyzed to develop a mental model or "common picture" that informs our daily decision making process and increases our chances of survival. To emulate this ability, we analyze the problem of multisensory data and information fusion as a sensemaking problem. We do this by decomposing the sensemaking process into its cognitive primitives of synthesis, reasoning and inference and reconstructing each primitive using computational methods.
Sensemaking involves putting stimuli into some kind of framework [1] . Sensemaking is also viewed as a thinking process that uses retrospective accounts to explain surprises [2] a reciprocal interaction of information seeking, meaning ascription and action [3] and an interpretive process that is necessary for "organizational members to understand and to share understandings about such features of the organization as what it is about, what it does well and poorly, what the problems it faces are and how it should resolve them" [4] . In [5] sensemaking is defined as "a process in which individuals develop cognitive maps of their environments".
In the military domain, sensemaking has been studied as a multidimensional process of developing an operational understanding and awareness within a complex and evolving task domain [6] , [7] , [8] . In asymmetric warfare for example, the adversaries evolve with different kinds of motivations and tactics. This introduces a level of complexity into the battle space information management that requires a military strategist to adopt new and novel ways of information handling and analysis. For instance, the commander must make sense of the evolving information through convoluted processes of hypotheses formulations, evidence collection and associations to the hypotheses, and gaining an understanding of the situation. As noted in [9] , the commander must draw inferences from uncertain data, identify appropriate sequences of objectives and optimally assign resources to ensure their attainment. Making sense of dynamic multivariate information in order to establish a reasonable justifiable belief about the adversary's intent is the core of the sense making process [10] .
Sensemaking of battlefield information is difficult for the following reasons: a) As asymmetric information, it is generally characterized by equivocation, different types of uncertainties, ambiguities, surprises, emerging and evolving features, and complexity; b) There is a problem of scale due to the military command hierarchy. The spiral nature of information transactions, processes, and feedback makes any closed-form analytical model difficult to apply in the sensemaking process and c) There is currently a lack of cognitive architectures that support the ability to integrate information for real-time sensemaking. Given the above challenges, this paper develops a Bayesian Abduction Model for Sensemaking Support (BAMSS). The BAMSS uses a classical Bayesian information fusion with cluster analytic algorithm to extract probable evidence from an adversary network. By populating the adversary network with the initial probability of evidence, the algorithm in BAMSS computes the posterior probabilities which represent the informational variables supporting specific sets of hypotheses in the network. The BAMSS is used to find a unique Most Probable Explanation (MPE) supporting a set of hypotheses.
BAYESIAN NETWORKS
A Bayesian network (BN) is a graphical model that encodes probabilistic relationships among variables within a context of interest. Variations of Bayesian networks developed in [11] have been used in many disciplines such as in medical diagnosis [12] and sensor data fusion [13] Dynamic Bayesian networks which are time dependent, have been used for military plan recognition [14] , tactical engagement planning [15] , prediction of enemy tactical intents [16] , representing knowledge about the enemy beliefs [17] , and updating uncertainties about changes in battlefield information [18] . In [19] BNs were used to develop an adversary model that captures goals, intentions, biases, beliefs and perceptions based on social cognition constructs.
Computer modeling and simulation of Bayesian networks has become robust and flexible in application to decision support systems. The models developed have some important roles to play in sensemaking. Examples include the framework for computational adversarial modeling and information systems [20] , Center of Gravity Network Effects Tool (COGNET) [21] , a dynamic Bayesian net for causal relationship between lower-level friendly tasks and higher-level effects on adversary systems [22] and tactical situation analysis [23] . In [24] Bayesian techniques were used to provide an analytical illustration of Iraq's nuclear program intelligence.
These researchers have focused mainly on the normative-deductive approach to decision making using Bayesian formalism. However, normative-deductive inference is more suitable to deterministic algorithms and fails to make efficient use of the expressive power of Bayesian networks. Deterministic algorithms do not perform optimally in complex and uncertain information environments such as the asymmetric battlefield.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 3 will describe Bayesian modeling and abductive inference applied in developing the framework for a computational sensemaking model as well as the prototype model development. Section 4 describes the experimental analysis of the model using vignettes that represent sensemaking tasks in asymmetric warfare domain. We discuss the experimental simulation results and the validation of the model in Section 5 and conclusions and opportunities for further research in the last section.
BAYESIAN BELIEF NETWORKS AND ABDUCTIVE INFERENCE
A Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) also referred to as a probabilistic network is a directed acyclic graph in which each node represents a random variable or uncertain quantity which can take two or more possible values [11] . Arcs signify the existence of direct causal influences between the linked variables and the strengths of these influences are quantified by conditional probabilities. A BBN is an augmented directed acyclic graph, represented by a pair (V, E), where, V is a set of vertices; E is a set of directed edges joining the vertices; and no loops are allowed. Formally, the structure of the BN is a representation of the factorization of the joint probability distribution over all the states of the random variable [25] . For a BN consisting of n variablesX 1 , X 2 ,..X n, the overall joint distribution over the variables is given by the product
Where П Xi represents the parent variables of X i .
An advantage of a network representation is that it allows people to express directly the fundamental qualitative relationship of direct dependency. The network then displays a consistent set of additional direct and indirect dependencies and preserves it as a stable part of the model, independent of the numerical estimates. The directionality of the arrows is essential for displaying non transitive dependencies. It is this computational role of identifying what information is relevant or not in any given situation that is attributed to the mental construct of causation [26] ; this is the core of a BN analysis.
Abduction in belief networks refers to inference from effects to the best explanations of the effects [27] . Based on the assumption that there is a causal model, an explanation is a configuration of the unobserved variables. The inference process is aimed at obtaining the MPE or the kMPEs, where k represents the selected best hypotheses in the network confirmed by the respective network pathways. In general, the variables that take the value "present" or "positive" in the MPE are considered the causes that explain the evidence. The kind of explanation is basically to offer a diagnosis for a set of observed anomalies. For instance, in medical expert systems, an explanation determines the disease or diseases that explain the evidence extracted from symptoms, signs, and test results.
Abduction intends to find the MPE with the configuration w having the maximum a-posteriori probability P(w|e),where eis the available evidence. When W includes all the unobserved variables, the process is known as total abduction; else, it is partial abduction. In general, given an observation o, a hypothesis h and the knowledge that h causes o, it is an abduction to hypothesize that h occurred. Abduction tries to synthesize a composite hypothesis explaining the entire observation from elementary hypotheses [28] .
We define Bayesian abductive inference for two instances of sensemaking: prospective (or predictive) sensemaking and retrospective sensemaking. For a prospective sensemaking we define a model of recursive Bayesian learning with data updates using the established procedure in [11] . Let H denote a hypothesis, d =d 1 
Comparing equations (1) and (2), it is easy to see that the old belief P(H|d n ) assumes the role of the prior probability in the computation of new beliefs; it completely summarizes the past experience. The updating needs only be multiplied by the likelihood function P(d|d n , H), which measures the probability of the new datum d, given the hypothesis and past observations. 
Where α is the weighted value that scales the probability function on the left of equation 3 so that the total probability in the observation space is equal to one.
In sensemaking analytics, belief updating per equations (2) and (3) amounts to computing the probability distribution over variables of interest conditional on other observed variables. For example, in a battle command situation, the commander might receive intelligence reports about rioting by the population in a contested area. He could be fairly certain that this is a civil unrest and avoid sending in a suppressive force. If in the next instance a routine patrol in the same area of unrest comes under sustained fire, then the probability of civil unrest is lowered and his belief is updated. The hypothesis "insurgent attack" gets more support and the probability density function over the hypothesis space changes.
INFERENCE ALGORITHM IN BAMSS
Bayesian inference is a technique of inference in which Bayes' rule is used to update the probability estimate for a hypothesis as additional evidence is acquired. Usually, a posterior probability is inferred given the observation of new data or evidence. In BAMSS, a naïve clustering technique is used to support the inference through a multiple-value classification method [29] .The algorithm works by first transforming the hierarchical Bayesian network into a clique tree where each node in the tree corresponds to a subset of variables in the original graph. A message parsing propagation is done over the clique tree. By transmitting information between the variables in the local clique rather than the full joint probability, an efficient inference algorithm is realized. The choice of the algorithm is based on the requirements for exact and efficient solution using BAMSS. These requirements are discussed in [29] for a hierarchical Bayesian network and consist of: 1) Initialization: Generating internal representations of beliefs from which the marginal distributions on individual nodes may be easily obtained. 2) Absorption of evidence: The effect of multiple pieces of evidence should be independent of the order of their arrival 3) Global propagation: The algorithm should enable the propagation of the effects of the evidence received through the network and enable belief revision in the nodes that are still not established. 4) Hypothesizing and propagating single items of evidence: The algorithm should allow for the ability to condition a node taking on a particular value and observe its effect throughout the network. 5) Planning: For nodes of particular interest, the algorithm should provide for the ability to efficiently assess the informational value in eliciting the response to nodes corresponding to potentially obtainable data. 6) Influential findings: After the data are in, the algorithm should have an ability to retract their effect in order to identify the strong causal factors.
The BAMSS algorithm is a hierarchical, top-down process. It starts by randomly selecting a set of hypotheses nodes as the initial state variables. The current state consists of the parent nodes. The posterior probabilities of all the children nodes conditional on the set of parent nodes are then computed. The algorithm moves through all the nodes this way, randomly selecting states and setting them as evidence. The sampling is complete when a state is assigned to all the nodes and belief updating is then performed. The evidence variables are informational variables since they reveal information about hypothesis variables. The process of information fusion in the BBN is accomplished by clustering the variables based on robust statistical properties such as distance metric or standard deviations from normed means. The pseudo code for BAMSS inference algorithm is shown in Figure 1 . 
SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS FOR BAMSS IMPLEMENTATION
The BAMSS environment uses Open Source software which is freely available under the General Public License. It consists of three modules: a network module, a computational module and a graphical user interface (GUI). The modular architecture and the open source implementation ensure that the model can be modified with additional modules developed to address new challenges. The network module uses the existing GeNIe (graphical network interface) library from the Decision Systems Laboratory of the University of Pittsburgh [30] . GeNIe allows the user to develop a Bayesian network representation of the problem domain. The computational model takes the input data from the network and performs belief updating and abductive inference using the cluster algorithm described in [29] . The GUI helps to integrate the network module and the computational module and allows the user to manipulate inputs (evidence) while observing the changes in the outputs. The textual and graphical output helps in the analysis of the effects of the This involves defining the domain state space, identifying all the critical causal variables and their relationships and establishing discretization states for all the identified variables. The network topology is also defined at this stage. New evidence such as observed data from the field or user defined prior probabilities of the parent nodes and the prior conditional probabilities of the child nodes are input into the developed network through the GUI. The user defines the hypothesis variables, the evidence variables and the target variables of interest using the created network. A fully defined BBN with a conditional probability distribution values is then loaded into the model through the GUI data acquisition function. Once the network loaded and initialized, evidence in the form of probabilities is input into the model through the GUI. The network module retrieves the input evidence from the user and initializes the appropriate BBN. The belief network with the initialized conditional probability tables (CPTs) is then loaded into the computational module.
The computational module is responsible for making inference. The inference engine model performs the tasks of network belief updating, belief revision and the abductive inference. The results of the computations are received as output by the user for visualization through the GUI and comprise of a text of the posterior probabilities of the variables in the belief network and a graphical display of the updated belief network. The updated belief network is also loaded and stored in the network module and can be retrieved by the computational module for the next iteration of belief updating. The computed updated beliefs form the prior probabilities for the network when the new evidence is introduced. Figure 3 shows the system software architecture and components of BAMSS. The Structural Modeling, Inference and Learning Engine (SMILE) library of C++ classes [30] provides the library of functions that are used to implement the Bayesian network inference algorithm. SMILE The executable BAMSS.jar is called by the user through a simple GUI command line. The .dll file interacts with the executable file in a read/write mode as shown in Figure 3 . The network module is created through the GeNIe graphical user interface. GeNIe is accessed through a web browser on the client side of a client-server model and contains all the functionality necessary to create a network with nodes and arrows representing variables and causal linkages respectively. The networks developed in GeNIe are loaded into the model by a simple command on the BAMSS GUI. The BAMSS interface facilitates user interaction with the main building blocks of the model in a read-only mode. The GUI is implemented in Java with the Java file ProbabilityUI.java and hosts command lines for all the model functionalities as well as the data input fields. The BayesianNetworkFitness.java is compiled to create the Java class that contains the subroutine for calculating the genetic algorithm fitness function. It interfaces with the SMILE library using the Java API for Genetic Algorithms (JAGA). JAGA API is an extensible API for implementing genetic algorithms in Java and contains a range of genetic algorithms, genotype representations and genetic operators. UpdateBayesGA.java contains classes for the algorithmic implementation of the Bayesian Genetic Algorithm. GAResults.java is a Java bean class which contains the final results of the Fitness subroutine after evaluation.
The sensemaking database is a repository of conditional probability tables that represent the knowledge base of the sensemaker. Initially, the database is loaded with apriori beliefs about the hypothesis variables and apriori conditionals for all the other evidence variables. The results of the BAMSS.jar executable file run are the posterior probabilities of a network loaded in the model and represent the updated beliefs of the sensemaker. These results are added into the database using a GUI command line and form the apriori beliefs for the next round of computation in read/write format. The results are saved and made available to the user for analyses. Figure 4 shows a screen capture of the GUI for the BAMSS model. In the first operation, the domain specific BBN from a file residing on the client computer is loaded into the module. With the BBN loaded, the user can use the GUI to perform other required functions such as inputting new evidence, using commands for computing posterior probabilities, performing inference and so on. The interface is divided into four quadrants. The first input fields for all the random variables defined in the network module. The network residing on the client side database is loaded into the GUI using the "Select Model File" command line. Evidence in the form of numeric probabilities fields are grouped according to the defined network hierarchical levels, with the topmost Level 1 containing fields for hypothesis variables, followed by fields for Level 2 evidence variables, Level 3 evidence variables and so on. The user can input the evidence for a single variable or can select multiple variables on different levels.
3.3.BAMSS GRAPHICAL USER INTER
To perform a computational inference, the appropriate algorithm is selected from the command buttons at the bottom of the first quadrant. Selecting "Update Belief computation of the posterior beliefs of the network variables given new evidence using the clustering algorithm. The algorithm gets the query and goes through the process of hierarchically sampling the nodes and assigning states until all the nodes in the network have an assigned state. Belief updating is then undertaken appropriate function in the ProbabilityUI.java reserved for another analysis under investigation to optimize The second and third quadrants show the results of the belief updating algorithm both textually and gra to clear the input and output fields of the GUI and input new evidence Figure 4 shows a screen capture of the GUI for the BAMSS model. In the first operation, the domain specific BBN from a file residing on the client computer is loaded into the module. With the BBN loaded, the user can use the GUI to perform other required functions such as inputting new evidence, using commands for computing posterior probabilities, performing inference and so on. The interface is divided into four quadrants. The first quadrant contains the input fields for all the random variables defined in the network module. The network residing on the client side database is loaded into the GUI using the "Select Model File" command line. Evidence in the form of numeric probabilities is then typed into the evidence input fields. The fields are grouped according to the defined network hierarchical levels, with the topmost Level 1 containing fields for hypothesis variables, followed by fields for Level 2 evidence variables, ence variables and so on. The user can input the evidence for a single variable or can select multiple variables on different levels.
To perform a computational inference, the appropriate algorithm is selected from the command first quadrant. Selecting "Update Belief-Bayes" will enable the computation of the posterior beliefs of the network variables given new evidence using the clustering algorithm. The algorithm gets the query and goes through the process of hierarchically mpling the nodes and assigning states until all the nodes in the network have an assigned state. undertaken and the completed results are compiled and output by the ProbabilityUI.java subroutine. Selection of the Genetic Algorithm reserved for another analysis under investigation to optimize BAMSS inference search space [31 The second and third quadrants show the results of the belief updating process for the selected algorithm both textually and graphically. The "Clear Evidence" command button allows the user to clear the input and output fields of the GUI and input new evidence at any point of time Figure 4 shows a screen capture of the GUI for the BAMSS model. In the first operation, the domain specific BBN from a file residing on the client computer is loaded into the module.
With the BBN loaded, the user can use the GUI to perform other required functions such as inputting new evidence, using commands for computing posterior probabilities, performing quadrant contains the input fields for all the random variables defined in the network module. The network residing on the client side database is loaded into the GUI using the "Select Model File" command line.
is then typed into the evidence input fields. The fields are grouped according to the defined network hierarchical levels, with the topmost Level 1 containing fields for hypothesis variables, followed by fields for Level 2 evidence variables, ence variables and so on. The user can input the evidence for a single variable or can
To perform a computational inference, the appropriate algorithm is selected from the command Bayes" will enable the computation of the posterior beliefs of the network variables given new evidence using the clustering algorithm. The algorithm gets the query and goes through the process of hierarchically mpling the nodes and assigning states until all the nodes in the network have an assigned state. and the completed results are compiled and output by the Genetic Algorithm is BAMSS inference search space [31] .
for the selected he "Clear Evidence" command button allows the user at any point of time. Table 1 gives some sample data. 
BAYESIAN NETWORK DEVE
The network development follows the top levels: strategic effect-, political operational respectively. Figure 5 is used to show the network topology. The network is based on the friendly force commander's perception of the adversary intent. The first level variables are for representing the end states, target states or goals of the adversary that the blue force commander would have to correctly infer for successful counterinsurgency operations. These effects both short-term and long-term. These top level effects inform the strategies and are key to effective courses of action (COA) planning. The variable set is Y 2 ,…Y n }. Strategic effects are directly influenced by 2. The variable set is X = {X 1 , X parent nodes and X is the set of children nodes. the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructural (PMESII) state variables of the battlespace.
Level 3 is the Military Operational Effects adversary will exploit to destabilize M 2 ,…M p }.The vector M has a set of nodes whose parents are from commanders and their staffs would need to state of adversary. At this level, the adversary aims are to generate and exploit fine scale complexity and will seek to prevent the counterinsurgents from acting at the organized for [32] .Level 4 is the linkages to the M nodes. These effects represent actions taken by the insurgents to influence certain outcomes in the battlespace. Depending on the choice of targets, the range of The network development follows the top-down military information hierarchy defined at four , political operational-, military operational-and tactical respectively. Figure 5 is used to show the network topology. The network is based on the friendly ion of the adversary intent. The first level variables are for Strategic Effects. These are a set of hypotheses variables representing the end states, target states or goals of the adversary that the blue force commander correctly infer for successful counterinsurgency operations. These effects term. These top level effects inform the commander of the strategies and are key to effective courses of action (COA) planning. The variable set is Strategic effects are directly influenced by Political Operational Effects defined at Level , X 2, …X m } which represent evidence variables for Y; Y is the set of children nodes. These are informational variables that represent the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructural (PMESII) state variables Military Operational Effects. These are the informational variables that the adversary will exploit to destabilize the PMESII factors and is represented by has a set of nodes whose parents are from X nodes. The friendly force would need to analyze these effects to correctly infer the At this level, the adversary aims are to generate and exploit fine scale complexity and will seek to prevent the counterinsurgents from acting at the scale they are ].Level 4 is the Tactical effects which are evidence variables with direct causal nodes. These effects represent actions taken by the insurgents to influence certain outcomes in the battlespace. Depending on the choice of targets, the range of Vol. 6, No. 1, January 2015 10 information hierarchy defined at four and tactical-levels, respectively. Figure 5 is used to show the network topology. The network is based on the friendly Figure 5 . A Bayesian network topology representation of the adversary intent . These are a set of hypotheses variables representing the end states, target states or goals of the adversary that the blue force commander correctly infer for successful counterinsurgency operations. These effects could be commander of the adversary's strategies and are key to effective courses of action (COA) planning. The variable set is Y= {Y 1 , defined at Level Y is the set of are informational variables that represent the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructural (PMESII) state variables These are the informational variables that the and is represented by M= {M 1 , nodes. The friendly force infer the desired end At this level, the adversary aims are to generate and exploit fine scale scale they are with direct causal nodes. These effects represent actions taken by the insurgents to influence certain outcomes in the battlespace. Depending on the choice of targets, the range of Tactical Effects may be quite extensive and diverse. Most of these effects are kinetic and their strategic outcome is usually second order, not necessarily a direct one. These target variables are denoted as T = {T 1 , T 2 ,…,T r } . Figure 6 shows the Bayesian network equivalent of Figure 5 with the real factors and nomenclatures used by the military. Here we have: 4 }, and T = {T 1 , T 2 , T 3 }. This gives a network of size 4*3*4*3 =144 arrangements. Note that the size increases depending on the indicator variables of each node in the network. The variables in the network are discretized into nonnumeric sub factors so as to use the exact search algorithm implemented in BAMSS. The discretization is based on factors from the expert judgment. The states of each node in the network are subfactors representing all the possible indicators each variable can take within the domain state space. With the network topology defined and all the variables discretized, its parameters can be fully specified. Network parameterization was accomplished by learning the prior probabilities of all the nodes without parents and the conditional probabilities of all the nodes with parents, conditional on these parents. 
THE SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
Simulation experiments were conducted using the sample historical data discussed earlier and summarized in Table 1 . The data were presented to the BAMSS model using the GUI below in Figure 7 . A node in the network was randomly selected and used as an input node for new evidence introduced into the model. With the input evidence varied from 0.1 to 0.9 in the range [0, 1], several simulation runs were performed on the model and the posterior belief distribution for each value of input evidence recorded.
Belief update was undertaken after CPT computation and the resultant posterior probabilities for all the nodes were displayed. the belief that there is a 40% chance that the objective of the insurgency is resistance and liberation of the country from occupation. Node Y 1 = y 12 is ascribed a probability of 0.3, meaning there is a 30% chance that a breakdown in law and order to disrupt counterinsurgent control of the local security situation is the effect under observation. Less belief Y 1 = y 13 = 0.2 is given to probability that the insurgent's intent is to exercise local population control. By the axioms of probability, the complement Y 1 =y 14 = 0.1 represents our belief that the effect under observation is simply an intent by the insurgents to provoke excessive raids by the counterinsurgent forces and use the second order effects of that action as a strategy for resistance. Next, we input the evidence values for Level 1 evidence variables, the Political OperationalEffectsX 1 , X 2 and X 3 . This is evidence that is obtainable by direct observation of battlefield conditions or by analyzing sensor data and other information from various sources as summarized in Table 1 . For example, it is known that a major influencing factor for conflict in the Middle East is ethnic and sectarian supremacy (X 1 ). By analyzing reports, the indicators are weighted such that fundamentalist ideology X 1 = x 12 is most probable at 50%. Equally probable is the legitimacy of Jihad or armed struggle against non-believers X 1 = x 13 = 0.4. For illustration purposes, the following assumptions can be further made: Sectarian identity (X 1 = x 11 ), though a dominant concept in insurgencies, is weakly supported with a 0.1 probability. For factor X 2 , evidence for disruption of the ability to carry out nation-building and stability operations is assessed. To this, there is slightly more evidence of operational modularity (X 2 = x 22 = 0.4), than the exploitation of local environment and feedback mechanisms (X 2 = x 21 = 0.3).Little evidence supports the notion of ad hoc threat forces, criminal networks, or part time forces (X 2 = x 23 = 0.1) while direct force projection to send a message of capability to the population (X 2 = x 24 = 0.2) is marginally better. Similarly, evidence values for variable X 3 (x 31 = 0.6, x 32 = 0.2, x 33 = 0.2) are input. More evidence may be entered for Levels 2 and 3.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND MODEL VALIDATION

CONDITIONAL POSTERIOR DISTRIBUTIONS
The right hand side of Figure 7 shows the textual and graphical output of the computed posterior beliefs of all the network variables after belief update in the light of new evidence is performed. 
PARENT AND CHILD NODE ANALYSIS
The posterior distribution for the selected network variables based on cause-effect (parent-child) relationships are shown in Tables 2-4 and the results are plotted against the probability of evidence of selected input variables (Figures 8-10 ). In this sensemaking vignette, the hypothesis variable is Y 1 = y 12 ( Law and Order Breakdown) and the informational variables are X 1 = x 11 (Sectarian Identity) and T 3 = t 32 (Infrastructure Sabotage). New evidence was introduced in node M 1 = m 11 , the Security Target Engagement. Figure 8 shows the posterior probability distribution of nodes after seven simulation runs.
By examining the evidence propagation in the first vignette, probability of Breakdown) remained relatively stable at 40% with increasing evidence of adversary targeting of the counterinsurgent security personnel.The relative stability of the posterior belief distribution implies that the causal effect of this variable is limited hence does not carry course of action. The probability that the operation is influenced by Sectarian Identity that operations against security personnel cannot be attributed to a particular group. In fact focusing on the sectarian identity of the group is detrimental to the course of action selection because of the correlation factor (r =0.984) (Infrastructure Sabotage| Insurgent Security Target Engagement An increase in infrastructure sabotage increase in insurgent security ta particular military operational effect. This COA protection for critical infrastructure and security targets. For the second sensemaking vignette, the hypothesis variable was selected as Ideology) and the informational variables were (Small Arms Attacks). New evidence was introduced in node Table 3 and Figure 9 show the posterior probability distributions of the variables after 7 simulation runs. The probability of ( Asymmetry) decreased from 60% to 35% as evidence for intelligence asymmetry increased from 0.1 to 0.9. This implies that better intelligence by the insurgent group this mode of operation. The proba minor variability at 40% similar to the effect Small Arms Attacks was not significantly influenced by the insurgent intelligence assets Both these effects are inadmissible as By examining the evidence propagation in the first vignette, probability of (Law and Order relatively stable at 40% with increasing evidence of adversary targeting of the counterinsurgent security personnel.The relative stability of the posterior belief distribution implies that the causal effect of this variable is limited hence does not carry much weight as a course of action. The probability that the Insurgent security Target Engagement as a mode of Sectarian Identity (X 1 = x 11 ) decreased from 50% to 30%. that operations against security personnel cannot be attributed to a particular group. In fact focusing on the sectarian identity of the group is detrimental to the course of action selection factor (r =0.984) and this effect could be discarded. Probability of Infrastructure Sabotage| Insurgent Security Target Engagement) increased from 20% to 40%. An increase in infrastructure sabotage could be regarded as the most likely tactical effect of the increase in insurgent security target engagement probably due to the vacuum created by this particular military operational effect. This COA could require the commander to increase protection for critical infrastructure and security targets.
For the second sensemaking vignette, the hypothesis variable was selected as Y 2 = y and the informational variables were M 1 = m 11 (Security Target Engagement ). New evidence was introduced in node X 3 = x 33 (Intelligence Asymmetry) and Figure 9 show the posterior probability distributions of the variables after 7 simulation runs. The probability of (Insurgent Security Target Engagement| Intelligence ) decreased from 60% to 35% as evidence for intelligence asymmetry increased from 0.1 to 0.9. This implies that better intelligence by the insurgent group may not direct this mode of operation. The probability of (Small Arms Attacks| Intelligence Asymmetry minor variability at 40% similar to the P(Insurgent Ideology|intelligence asymmetry) not significantly influenced by the insurgent intelligence assets Both these effects are inadmissible as COA. Law and Order relatively stable at 40% with increasing evidence of adversary targeting of the counterinsurgent security personnel.The relative stability of the posterior belief distribution much weight as a as a mode of . This implies that operations against security personnel cannot be attributed to a particular group. In fact focusing on the sectarian identity of the group is detrimental to the course of action selection be discarded. Probability of from 20% to 40%. likely tactical effect of the rget engagement probably due to the vacuum created by this require the commander to increase after new evidence is introduced in node M 1 y 22 (Insurgent Security Target Engagement) and T 2 = t 21 (Intelligence Asymmetry). and Figure 9 show the posterior probability distributions of the variables after 7
Target Engagement| Intelligence ) decreased from 60% to 35% as evidence for intelligence asymmetry increased from directly influence Small Arms Attacks| Intelligence Asymmetry) showed P(Insurgent Ideology|intelligence asymmetry). The tactical not significantly influenced by the insurgent intelligence assets. In the last vignette, we considered the hypothesis variable informational variables we set X New evidence was introduced into variable posterior probability distributions. The probability of ( decreased from 50% to 40% (approximately) with an increase in evidence of effect from 0.1 to 0.9. The probability of theP(Civilian Shelters| Arson) remained constant at 30%. consider the tactical effect as a reflection of nationalistic in the PMESII spectrum to address this effect. P(Civilian Shelters| Arson) are not admissible for Figure 10 show the posterior probability distributions. The probability of (Insurgent Modular Operations| Arson decreased from 50% to 40% (approximately) with an increase in evidence of Arson effect from 0.1 to 0.9. The probability of Nationalism increased from 30% to 40% while ) remained constant at 30%. The commanders' COA should as a reflection of nationalistic feelings and take appropriate in the PMESII spectrum to address this effect. P(Insurgent Modular Operations|Arson ) are not admissible for COA analysis. 
DISCUSSION
The probability distributions for adversary. The probability distributions for analyst inference on the areas of focus that will enable the adversary to achieve their desired Strategic Effects. The probability distributions for actual methods, techniques, tactics and procedures th selected targets. By performing infer conclusions about both the adversary intents and use the information for courses of action analysis as shown in Table 5 below. Res above are shown in Table 6 . The probability distributions for Strategic Effects provide an insight into the end state of the adversary. The probability distributions for Operational Effects (Military and Political) analyst inference on the areas of focus that will enable the adversary to achieve their desired . The probability distributions for Tactical Effects provide inference into the actual methods, techniques, tactics and procedures that the adversary may employ to attack selected targets. By performing inference at this level, an analyst can reasonably draw the adversary intents and use the information for courses of action below. Results from sensitivity analysis on the experiments rep provide an insight into the end state of the Operational Effects (Military and Political) give the analyst inference on the areas of focus that will enable the adversary to achieve their desired provide inference into the at the adversary may employ to attack reasonably draw the adversary intents and use the information for courses of action ults from sensitivity analysis on the experiments reported Summary of Inferential Conditions and Courses of Action for Sample Sensemaking Tasks.
Results Interpretation
Insufficient evidence to show that insurgent attacks on coalition security targets are the cause of the breakdown in law and order Operations against coalition security targets cannot be attributed to a ase in infrastructure sabotage by the insurgents may be a second order effect of targeting security because of the security gaps created. Insurgents may be using the To further gain more insight into the simulated results, a correlations analysis was performed on the conditional probability distributions. Tables 7 & 8 x 11 ) and the probability of Insurgent security Target Engagement (m 11 ) and c) Statisitically significant negative correlation (r = -0.987) between the evidence of intelligence asymmetry (x 33 ) and the probability of security target engagement (m 11 ). 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
BAMSS has been presented as a decision support tool for sensemaking analysis. At the current stage, BAMSS can identify a single most probable explanation from a BBN and extract the prevalent conditional probability values to help the sensemaking analysts to understand the causeeffect of the adversary information. The vignettes used allow BAMSS to simulate prospective sensemaking by adjusting the model of posterior probability information integration when new data are available to the analyst. This approach represents the dynamic battlefield information and replicates the mind of the adversary intention. Thus, in BAMSS, the friendly force commander uses the adversary information to prospectively make sense of "what may be the next state" or course of action of the enemy.
The BAMSS'GUI is implemented using Open Source software. The GUI allows for data acquisition, formatting for BAMSS analytics, selection of the appropriate Bayesian data fusion model, and simulation output visualization. To use BAMSS, all the development software tools have to be installed and run on the client machine. However, the executable BAMSS files are easily portable and are readily available to the user. The only software component accessible on the web is GeNie which is used for network design. As an on-going research, the following activities are planned: a) Since BAMSS requires a user defined BN, additional research is needed to develop an automatic network module capable of taking the user's data in any format and building a corresponding network for BBN. b) Include an intelligent help system in the GUI to provide design and analysis help to the user. c) Transition BAMSS into a web version that can operate in a client-server model for easy access to many analysts and for use in simulation experiments.
